Trusted Routing in IoT

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Outline

- Sensors and Sensor Networks – Are these the most Critical Components in IoT?
- What is the Security & Cyber Risk in IoT?
- How big is the Loss of Data due to the Break in Routing Paths?
- How to establish a Trusted Routing in IoT?

Sensors and networks: A value-creation framework

- A heavy reliance on **wireless communications** (typically a best-effort network).
- A range of **communication protocols** to satisfy the communication needs of diverse applications.

Wireless Sensor Network

many low-cost, low-power devices communicating wirelessly with BS

IoT systems differ from traditional IT systems?

- **Environment:** physical exposure of IoT devices
- **Resources:** sensors are low-cost, low-power, resource constrained devices
- **Variety:** more types of devices and different types of networks in IoT
- **Volume:** billions of IoT devices compared to millions of IT devices
- **Consequences:** disruption of IoT systems could lead to large economic losses and have a significant impact on the welfare of people

BUT it also creates new opportunities for all that information to be compromised!

The communication protocols have not been designed with a security goal in mind



The network level attacks can cause data loss and increase the data collection latency

Network communication can be attacked, causing the **loss of data** which can compromise system functionality and cause failure.

?

SENSITIVE DATA!
TIME-CRITICAL DATA!



Blackhole attack



Sinkhole attack



Replay attack

Understanding the impact and consequences of an attack helps to prevent possible DoS



Implementation: Contiki OS & Cooja (Contiki simulator), 100nodes random topology

Observations:

- Each attack has it's own signature wrt to the network performance.
- Two groups: 1. attacks that introduce additional data → reduced PDR and increased E2E delay 2. attacks that reduce no. of packets → reduced PDR and reduced E2E delay.

A novel self-healing scheme that detects and recovers from common attack scenarios



Each sensor builds a trust model of its neighbourhood to adapt routing decisions

- Pairwise trust between a node and its neighbours.
- Choose your routing paths accordingly.
- This allows data to **flow around** regions of the network affected by an attack.



A simple notification scheme propagates routing decisions from the affected areas to the sink

- Change due to a potentially malicious activity in the neighbourhood triggers the creation of mobile agents.
- They spread the information in network so that the damage of an attack is bounded.



Our solution reduces data loss due to the varied attack scenarios down to 1% (5% on average)



Sinkhole attacks: a) 50 nodes, multiple attackers b) 25, 50 and 100 nodes, single attacker



Blackhole attacks: a) 50 nodes, multiple attackers b) 25, 50 and 100 nodes, single attacker



Replay attacks: a) 50 nodes, multiple attackers b) 25, 50 and 100 nodes, single attacker

It achieves low overheads of 1% and a detection reliability of 99.3% tested across scenarios



Overhead in 50 nodes network, multiple attackers a) sinkhole attack b) blackhole attack c) replay attack

The **sensitivity** of our solution can be adjusted per user requirements by setting a sensitivity parameter α. While α = 0.9 gives the lowest number of false positives, we opted for more conservative approach and α = 0.7 which ensures a good sensitivity to all attacks with 99.3% detection reliability.

To conclude…

Our experimental results showed **high effectiveness** in terms of data loss rate requiring **low operational overheads** for varied attack scenarios.

- CISCO/Silicon Valley Community Foundation “Fog to FIELD”
- S4 (EPSRC Programme Grant): Science for Sensor Systems Software

[1] **I. Tomić** and J. A. McCann. “A Survey of potential security issues in existing wireless sensor network protocols”, IEEE Internet of Things Journal, 2017.

[2] **I. Tomić** et al. “Run time self-healing security for wireless sensor networks”. July 2017. Under review.

[3] https://labs.ripe.net/Members/ivana_tomic/iot-turning-evil

Thank you for your attention!