

**PREFIX  BROKER**

# Cleaning up after the Nr 3 SPAM botnet and the worst prefix

By Erik Bais – RIPE75

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


# A bit of background

## Taking down of the largest GRUM bot network

- A nice read about this whole story : <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/07/top-spam-botnet-grum-unplugged/>
- Once a botnet is down, you can see the effects of that botnet (when it has the size of GRUM) in the global spam effects..

# Stats of Grum during July – 2012 till shutdown



Source: Symantec Message Labs


# Taking over the IP's of a C&C ...

- When all the C&C's where down, we got access to the 'GRUM' IP's.
- And even better .. The actual server was shutdown, but not wiped. ;-)
- We wipe the server (after a backup) and setup a secure sinkhole for the zombie's ...

# Target : Cleaning the zombie's


- Taking down the C&C's and the botnet will leave a lot of infected PC's (zombies) ... dormant ..
- How do you clean those zombies ?
- We opted for reporting to the ISP's per unique connection to the C&C IP's with a signature.. Once per day .. And later per hour ..
- Not all malware has a reliable 'kill / un-install switch' and you don't want to be held responsible for that ..

# Initial stats by Country and Unique IP's (Grum)



# Weather maps of the stats - GRUM

grum  
Start: 2012-07-29 22:19:41  
End: 2012-08-08 20:01:48



## So how did we do this ?

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- Once we had access to the C&C IP's, we worked together with ISC SANS and Shadowserver for building the right infra for a new feed.
- No need to build your own Abuse reporting infra .. Shadowserver already has this infrastructure in place !!
- And a lot of ISP's already parse their messages ...



# Running the feeds

- Running the feeds means you would expect some clean-up in the numbers ...
- Not exactly ... ok.. Some improvements .. But not a lot ..

# The down-side of opt-in reporting

- Shadowserver only reports to ISP's that wanted to receive their messages..
- Yes, those reports are : opt-in ..
- So we discussed the approach with Abusix and they suggested the following :
  - Report each hour on each unique IP connection.. Instead of each day..
  - Use abuse mailbox info in the IRR DB's and send each hour in x-arf.

# More stats – September 2012

```
• +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
• | timestamp          | source | tag  | connections | unique_ips | unique_asns | unique_geos |
• +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
• | 2012-09-16 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1518703 | 87654 | 2161 | 175 |
• | 2012-09-15 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1685809 | 93043 | 2231 | 178 |
• | 2012-09-14 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1819142 | 102839 | 2539 | 185 |
• | 2012-09-13 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1785254 | 105531 | 2603 | 186 |
• | 2012-09-12 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1809333 | 106376 | 2626 | 183 |
• | 2012-09-11 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1874680 | 107011 | 2646 | 185 |
• | 2012-09-10 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1804284 | 106289 | 2635 | 184 |
• | 2012-09-09 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1708316 | 94092 | 2249 | 182 |
• | 2012-09-08 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1720786 | 98288 | 2277 | 177 |
• | 2012-09-07 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1710694 | 106210 | 2534 | 186 |
• +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

# Results in November 2012 !!

```
• +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
• | timestamp           | source | tag | connections | unique_ips | unique_asns | unique_geos |
• +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
• | 2012-11-13 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1200093 | 69840 | 1929 | 173 |
• | 2012-11-12 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1245087 | 69446 | 1916 | 171 |
• | 2012-11-11 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1191635 | 64081 | 1680 | 167 |
• | 2012-11-10 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1159224 | 66043 | 1724 | 173 |
• | 2012-11-09 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1160222 | 71957 | 1946 | 173 |
• | 2012-11-08 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1242629 | 72832 | 1985 | 168 |
• | 2012-11-07 00:00:00 | drones | grum | 1261095 | 74043 | 1995 | 172 |
```

# The Level3 abuse desk ‘issue’

- The sinkhole hoster almost got shutdown by their upstream because they didn't match the reports correctly to their ‘offending’ customers
- They thought the sinkhole was the source of the issue ..
- This took a couple days to understand the issue and to fix the reporting.
  - Lesson learned : don't include the sinkhole IP in the abuse reports.

A huge shout out to :



## Next challenge : the ‘dirtiest’ prefix ...

- After the experience with the GRUM botnet ... we had the opportunity to buy the LIR with IP space from a Dutch bulletproof hoster ...
- The person running the hoster, was just released by the Dutch Police ... and was planning to sell his IP space.
- It looked like a proper challenge to get that IP space usable again ...

## How bad was it ?

- The IP space was blacklisted listed for several years .. Due to known abuse ..
- On SBL .. ( over 75 times .. For the actual /19 and many /32 and /24's )
- On DROP .. ( Is anyone actually using this ?? )
- and that was just on Spamhaus .. But also on many other RBL's and lists.



# Approach

- Get full ownership of the LIR.
- Change all references from the previous holder to the new holder.
- Build a new sinkhole.
- Start routing the IP's to the sinkhole ...
- See what we find ... we might get lucky ...

# Hoping for the jackpot



# The logs revealed ... 12 C&C's

- GRUM bot zombies .. ( I wonder how we found these.. 😊)
- Citadel zombies
- Alina zombies
- Black Energy
- Fake AV


# Happy happy joy joy



## Now what ?


- See if anyone is actually null-routing traffic to the specific prefix ..?
- RIPE Atlas was a great help in finding any routing issues like SH DROP filtering for instance.
- Contacting the RBL owners to de-list the prefix ..

# Initial replies from the RBL's



## Explain it again with more logic ...

- Show them what we are doing ..
- Show initial results of the sinkhole ..
- Kindly explain that we can't (and won't) be held hostage or accountable from someone else's actions or lack of that..
- Receive kind replies :



# Selling the IP Space

- The new owner knew which IP space he was buying and the reputation of the original owner ... Transparency is key ..
- They knew upfront about our efforts to clean up the space and the sinkhole.
- The sinkhole was provided along with the feeds to Shadowserver and Abusix after the IP transfer.
- The buyer wanted to purchase the IP space ‘over time’ ...



# Lessons learned :

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Almost all IP ranges can be cleaned .. But some historic issues, take a HUGE amount of time/effort to clean. And some people would be more than happy to help you..

You might be able to get a good deal as long as you don't mind null-routing some of the old C&C IP's in a /19 or so.

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**PREFIX IPv4 BROKER**

*Any questions ? ??*





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# THANK YOU



## ADDRESS

De Hoefsmid 13  
1851PZ Heiloo  
The Netherlands



## EMAIL

[sales@prefixbroker.net](mailto:sales@prefixbroker.net)



## PHONE

+31 85 902 0417

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Feel free to contact us if you have any questions